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The modernist mind extended
 Samuel Beckett, his fiction and the extended mind theory
Olga Beloborodova
1
This article elucidates an on-going PhD project whose purpose is to apply the 
extended mind theory (henceforth the EMT) to Samuel Beckett as a modernist writer and 
to his fictional characters. The project is in turn part of a larger effort to reassess the alleged 
modernist “inward turn”,
2
 following David Herman’s call to consider the environment as an 
important factor in the evocations of fictional minds in literary Modernism.
3
 The article will 
also shed some light on the methodology applied in the project, discuss possible pitfalls and 
challenges it may harbour, and outline its structure. Furthermore, the article will attempt to 
motivate the choice of the EMT from a wide array of “externalist” theories in modern cognitive 
science, as well as explain how cognitive processes involved in creative writing can serve as an 
example of extended cognition. 
The paper has the following structure: Part I begins with a sketch of the alleged “inward 
turn” in literary Modernism, as well as David Herman’s appeal for its thorough reassessment. 
After a brief overview of the origins of “active externalism”
4
 in analytic philosophy and in 
cognitive science, the EMT will be discussed and its choice as the theoretical bedrock for the 
project explained. Part II deals with the writer as a cognising being and presents the creative 
writing process as an example of extended cognition, with the Flower and Hayes’s (1981) 
theory of cognitive processes involved in creative writing as a theoretical basis. Samuel Beckett 
(as a representative of late modernism) and his oeuvre will serve as a real-life case study for 
“extending” both the writing process and the fictional minds beyond the bounds of skin and 
skull, and examples from Beckett’s texts will be provided to illustrate the arguments.
Both the article and the PhD project it describes are heavily indebted to the ground-breaking 
work of Dirk Van Hulle, who launched the idea to combine cognitive narratology
5
 and the 
EMT by means of genetic critical analysis in his book, Modern manuscripts (2014). My research 
is meant to offer example-based support for Van Hulle’s main idea – namely, that studying 
manuscripts as material traces of the writer’s extended mind will furnish us with insights on 
how the writers of narratives interact with their environment, and how the storyworlds the 
writer creates are part and parcel of the minds of fictional characters inhabiting them.
I. Modernism and philosophy of mind
Modernism: not quite the “inward turn”
Ever since Erich Kahler introduced the concept in 1973, it has become generally accepted to 
regard literary Modernism as a movement that has consciously made an “inward turn” towards 
the mind, making it the sole subject of its study and thus leaving the “external” historical, 
political, and socio-cultural elements largely outside the scope of literary endeavour. Modernists 
themselves have greatly contributed to this interpretation of their work, the famous example 




2 Kahler, E. The 




3 cf. Herman, D. “Re-
minding modernism.” 
In: The emergence of 
mind, edited by David 
Herman, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska 
Press, 2011, pp. 243-272. 
4 Just like “extended 
cognition”, “active 
externalism” is an 
umbrella term for all 
theories that assign 
a constitutive role to 
extracranial objects 
in the process of 
human cognition. I 




5 According to David 
Herman (who coined 
the term), cognitive 
narratology is “the 
study of mind-relevant 
aspects of storytelling 
practices” (in The living 
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being Virginia Woolf’s appeal to her peers to “look within” and “examine […] an ordinary mind 
on an ordinary day”.
6
 With great verve she accused her “materialist” contemporaries of writing 
about “unimportant things”, referring to their “[concern] not with the spirit but with the body”.
7
 
Instead, she insists that the true task of a novelist is to “convey this varying, this unknown and 
uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture 
of the alien and external as possible”.
8
 It is interesting to see how Woolf uses the words “alien” and 
“external” in an almost synonymous fashion, thus inadvertently invoking the key Cartesian 
concept of the mind/body dualism. The “inward turn”, according to Woolf, is the only method 
of writing “the proper stuff of fiction”. x
While nobody doubts Woolf’s good intentions, reality does seem to be more complex 
than her simple appeal to “look within”, as the so-called “external” element has never quite 
disappeared from modernist fiction. Despite the presence of a great deal of introspection on 
the part of the characters, their thoughts and actions are more often than not activated by their 
context, not to mention their own bodies. It is therefore not surprising that in the past decades, 
the “inward turn” of literary Modernism has been successfully questioned by a number of 
scholars, most famously by David Herman. In his seminal article, “Re-minding Modernism”, he 
argued that despite the programmatic calls to the contrary, both modernist writers and their 
fictional characters were firmly embedded in their environment: “Narratives written during 
[Modernism] can […] be placed in productive dialogue with recent models of the mind as 
distributed across brain, body and world”.
9
 By linking modernist fiction to “externalist” theories 
of cognition (and explicitly referring to the EMT), Herman suggests that contrary to common 
assumption, “the [modernist] mind does not reside within; instead, it emerges through humans’ 
dynamic interdependence with the social and material environment they seek to navigate”.
10
 
Building on Herman’s idea, Dirk Van Hulle refreshingly proposes genetic critical analysis as a 
tool for the exploration of the extended mind of the writer and of her fictional characters, and 
to study the writer’s notebooks and manuscripts as “external” vehicles of cognition.
11
 Aware 
of the danger of committing the mortal sin of the intentional fallacy,
12
 Van Hulle rightly states 
that such an investigation “does not […] necessarily imply a search for the author’s intentions”.
13
 
Indeed, it stands to reason that the knowledge of the writer’s involvement in the production 
of narratives does not automatically endorse the autobiographical reading of her work, even 
though it is not implausible to imagine that modernist authors, in their quest to plumb the 
depths of the human mind, would probably look to their own minds (at least) as points of 
departure. However, in order to avoid the mire of the intentional fallacy debate, I shall keep 
the level of production of narratives (i.e., the discussion of the writer’s “extended” cognitive 
processes) completely separate from looking for “extended minds” in the fictional storyworlds 
evoked in texts. In this sense, modernist fiction, precisely because of its preoccupation with 
human cognitive and conscious processes, represents a rich body of material for an enquiry 
into human cognition in the domain of literary narrative. 
In the light of the above description, the work of the late modernist Samuel Beckett is a 
particularly interesting case in point. To begin with, he maintained a lifelong interest in the 
workings of the human mind, making it the central topic of virtually all his plays and works of 
fiction.
14
 Beckett’s habit of preserving his numerous manuscripts is another crucial reason for 
his choice as the case study for this project, as the availability of a large body of manuscripts 
obviously facilitates the genetic critical analysis of his (or indeed anyone’s) literary oeuvre. 
By subjecting a selection of his notebooks and drafts to both the exogenetic and endogenetic 
6 Woolf, V. “Modern 
fiction.” In: The common 
reader, edited by 
Andrew McNeillie. 
San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 
1919, 1984, pp. 146-154; 
see also Herman, D. 
Op. cit., 2011, p. 250.
7 Woolf, V. Op. 
cit., 1919, 1984.
8 Ibidem, my italics.
9 Herman, D. Op. 
cit., 2011, p. 253.
Ibidem, p. 254.
10 Ibidem, p. 254.




12 The term was originally 
defined in 1946 by 
Wimsatt and Beardsley 
as a reaction against the 
biographical approach 
to literary criticism, i.e. 
the claim that knowing 
what the author had 
in mind at the time of 
writing is key to the 
proper understanding 
of the text.
13 Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit., 2014, p. 130.
14 Also, Beckett’s alleged 
Cartesianism is of 
interest to us, as the 
philosophical basis 
of the EMT is at 
least partly anti-
Cartesian in nature.
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analysis, I hope to uncover Beckett’s extended mind as reflected in his writing style: in other 
words, I would like to establish just how his interaction with external sources (notebooks) and 
his own text (drafts) affect his creative writing. As for the extended minds of Beckett’s fictional 
characters, I will attempt to trace them both in the manuscripts and in the published texts 
(focusing exclusively on the latter in this paper), despite the obvious difficulties in making 
plausible links between any changes in the drafts and the evocations of fictional minds, as Van 
Hulle also notes.
15
   
Philosophy of mind – analytic philosophy and cognitive science
Modernist writers were not alone in their attempts to explore the human mind; the turn 
of the century also witnessed philosophers increasingly addressing the subject of human 
cognition and consciousness. In their typically modernist effort to “make it new” (an appeal by 
Ezra Pound to his literary colleagues), the founders of what was to become known as analytic 
philosophy (such as Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein) believed that philosophy should become 
much more scientific, i.e., based on the laws of logic and natural sciences. Specifically, it should 
rely solely on the third-person perspective and ban all “speculation” from philosophical 
discourse. In their fascination with a systematic approach, they used language as an example 
of a stringent and logical system. In the 1960s, analytic philosophy entered the realm of 
cognitive science, and the focus shifted from language to AI and neuroscience, with neural 
networks and computers acting as models for the human brain. Although cognitive science 
is clearly an umbrella term for a wide variety of mind-related disciplines and theories, one 
idea has remained unchallenged across its broad spectrum: while rejecting Cartesian mind/
body dualism, early cognitive scientists have sealed the mind hermetically inside the brain 
and insisted that all cognitive processes happened inside the head, thus (perhaps unwittingly) 
upholding another Cartesian principle of the strict internal/external divide. 
According to the traditional “Cartesian” cognitive science doctrine, human cognition turns 
on two essential ingredients: (1) mental representations of the world that are formed on the 
basis of perceptual information, and (2) a set of rules that manipulate these representations, 
whereby – crucially – “both the representations and the operations by which they are 
transformed are internal to the brain”.
16
 It is important to realise that “Cartesian” cognitive 
science does not deny the role of the body and the environment in the formation of mental 
representations; however, this interpretation of the role of external factors means that all 
they do is cause cognitive processes to occur inside the brain; in no way do they participate in 
cognition properly so called. 
Despite the initial (and probably still on-going) dominance of traditional cognitive science, 
new developments – often brought together under the umbrella term of “active externalism” 
– have questioned in the past few decades the internalist mantra that mainstream cognitive 
science has made its credo. The scope of this paper does not allow for an elaborate account 
of all the theories belonging to the domain of “active externalism”: suffice it to say that the 
roles of the body and the world at large in shaping human cognition have finally received 
due recognition, although not everyone agrees on the degree to which external factors drive 
cognitive processes. In other words, while most cognitive scientists acknowledge their causal 
role (insisting on the actual cognitive processes being exclusively neural and therefore internal), 
15 Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit., 2014, p. 4.
16 Rowlands, M. The 
new science of the mind. 
Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2010, p. 30.
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others – such as the founding fathers of the EMT – believe in their truly “constitutive” function, 
meaning that without external factors certain cognitive processes are simply impossible. The 
following section outlines the principles of the EMT and explains its choice as the theoretical 
cornerstone underlying the enquiry both into the creative writing process and into fictional 
minds. 
The extended mind thesis (EMT)
The idea behind the EMT is really quite simple: in fact, so simple that it took the “founding 
fathers” Andy Clark and David Chalmers just one article of a little over twenty pages to present 
it to the reader.
17
 The cornerstone of the EMT is the claim that human cognition is neither 
exclusively neural (i.e., internal), nor merely embodied (i.e., depends on our sensorimotor 
activity): instead, it extends beyond brain and body into the world at large, often (though not 
always) including external objects as equal participants in cognitive processes. However, this 
apparent simplicity is deceptive, as the subsequent intellectual battle between their fierce 
opponents and die-hard fans has shown. The obvious issue here is the fact that many scholars 
are not convinced that external objects can constitutively contribute to cognition. Unlike the 
thesis of embodied cognition (that incorporates the body into cognitive processes), what Clark 
and Chalmers propose is seemingly even more counter-intuitive (at least for those who have 
been formed by the traditional internalist doctrine). Few can deny the connection between 
body and brain (indeed, the brain is obviously a rather essential part of the body), in whatever 
way this connection operates; however, external objects are quite a different story altogether 
(or so it seems).
18
A clear pun on Hilary Putnam’s catchy conclusion (“’meaning’ just ain’t in the head”), Clark 
and Chalmers’ claim is that “[c]ognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head”.
19
 They propose that in 
extended cognition,
[…] the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. […] 
If we remove the external component the system’s behavioural competence will drop, 
just as it would if we removed part of its brain.
20
 
Clark and Chalmers note that offloading information from the brain into the environment 
has always been an intrinsic feature of human behaviour (referring to the invention of signs 
and symbols in order to record information or perform calculations as a prime example of such 
offloading). They use a thought experiment to illustrate their point, in which they compare 
cognitive behaviours of an Alzheimer’s patient (Otto) and of someone with a fully functioning 
natural memory (Inga). 
Because Otto’s memory is highly deficient, he relies on a notebook that he carries with him 
wherever he goes and in which he enters whatever information he deems necessary (such as 
dates, events, names, addresses, etc.). Whenever he needs a particular piece of information, all 
he does is consult his notebook. Inga, on the other hand, has a normal biological memory and 
stores all the information in her head. Similarly, whenever she needs to retrieve a particular 
fact, name or location, she consults her natural memory and tries to find the right “entry”. Clark 
17 This is of course not 
entirely true: Clark’s 
1997 book Being there 
had already outlined the 
main ideas behind the 
EMT before the article 
was published in 1998.
18 Michael Wheeler makes 
a similar point when 
he states that both the 
traditional “internalist” 
cognitive science and 
the proponents of the 
embodied/embedded 
approach “ultimately 
think of cognition as 
a resolutely skin-side 
phenomenon” and do 
not consider external 
objects (such as pen 
and paper) part of 
a cognitive system 
(Menary, R. “Cognitive 
integration and the 
extended mind.” In: 
The extended mind. 
Edited by Richard 
Menary. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 
2010, pp. 227-244).
19 Menary, R. Op. 
cit., 2010, p. 29.
20 Ibidem.
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and Chalmers argue that Otto’s and Inga’s information retrieval techniques are essentially not 
as different as they seem at first glance: the only difference is that Inga’s path to the right piece 
of information is entirely internal, whereas Otto uses both internal and external elements in 
order to achieve the same goal (see Clark and Chalmers 1998).
It goes without saying that not all external objects can be part of an extended cognitive 
system (whereas the internal component is always present). The EMT claims that cognitive 
processes are hybrid (i.e., containing both internal and external components) only if these 
components are reliably coupled to one another.
21
 Reliable coupling simply means that external 
objects required for certain cognitive tasks are always at hand and used for the right purpose. 
Clark and Chalmers refer to Otto’s manipulation of his notebook as an example of reliable 
coupling. They also reject the danger of damage or loss of the notebook as a reason for its 
potential unreliability, stating rightly that the biological brain is by no means immune to 
failure. Similarly, the writer’s interaction with her notebooks and manuscripts can also be seen 
as an illustrative example of reliable coupling and by extension of the extended mind at work. 
Because reliable coupling may sound somewhat vague and too prone to personal 
interpretation, Clark invokes the Parity Principle as the criterion for the cognitive status of a 
coupled system’s external component:
22
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the 




To use the popular example of a pocket calculator, the Parity Principle applies thus: 
obviously one could try and perform complex calculations in the head (even if the process is 
time-consuming and prone to error), but in order to save time and ensure an error-free result 
we resort to an external object instead. Hence the calculator could be said to “stand in” for 
the brain (for the time it is being used for calculations). Along the same lines, one could (at 
least theoretically) expect the writer of narratives to develop and retain all her ideas inside her 
brain; however, this will most probably lead to a considerable loss of information and a great 
confusion of structure, which is why some form of external memory aid (i.e., pen and paper) 
is typically used instead. To take an example relevant for our purposes, Beckett’s novel Watt 
contains a high number of permutations that would have been impossible to realise without 
using pen and paper: Chris Ackerley mentions one particular example of 81(!) permutations all 
written out in full in one of the Watt-notebooks.
24
  
Although it provides a clearly defined criterion for the EMT, the Parity Principle is also 
the target of much criticism both from the defenders and opponents of active externalism. 
In particular, Menary claims that invoking the liberal functionalism argument in order to 
equate Otto’s notebook to Inga’s biological memory is a bridge too far, since the differences 
are simply too fundamental.
25
 Instead, Menary claims that the Parity Principle is in fact 
irrelevant for the discussion, and proposes the concept of Cognitive Integration - based on 
the complementarity rather than similarity of external and internal components - as a possibly 
less controversial alternative. This is how Hutto and Myin define the essential difference 
between the parity-based EMT and its complementarity-based counterpart: while the Parity 
Principle insists on the external components to cognition being mere “substitutes” for the 
21 Clark, A. and 
Chalmers, D. “The 
extended mind.” In: 
The extended mind, 
edited by Richard 
Menary. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 
(1998) 2010, pp. 27-42.
22 The Parity Principle 
underscores the 
EMT’s adherence 
to the principles of 
liberal functionalism: 
in simple terms, this 
means that an object’s 
intrinsic properties are 
less important than its 
function within the 
system and that the 
same object may serve 
different purposes on 
different occasions (see 
also Wheeler, M. “In 
defense of extended 
functionalism.” In: The 
extended mind. Edited 
by Richard Menary. 
Cambrodge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2010).
23 Menary, R. Op. 
cit., 2010, p. 44.  
24 Ackerley, C. J. 
Obscure locks, simple 
keys. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010, pp. 181-4.
25 See also Sutton in 
Menary, R. Op. cit.,  
2010, p. 206 for a 
similar line of thought.
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internal ones, complementarity-based EMT claims that “the external features […] make acts 
and forms of cognition possible that would not be so by using internal means and resources 
alone. Thus the mind extends only if […] internal and external features play different roles”.
26
 
Similarly, Sutton argues that complementarity could be key to “the investigation into ways in 
which integration into larger cognitive systems may alter even the inner parts of those larger 
systems”,
27
 invoking language as a perfect example of an external structure that has the capacity 
to alter our neurological processes. The obvious relevance of language to the topic of creative 
writing merits a short detour into its place in the extended cognition debate.
As the basis for analytic philosophy and much of cognitive science (esp. in the early days of 
its development as a fully fledged scientific branch), language has always been important to the 
scientific study of the human mind. This is not surprising, since language (a linguistic system 
of syntax and semantics as opposed to a mere communication system) is a distinctly human 
phenomenon, and one that shapes our thoughts and actions in no small measure. Building 
on this unique connection, Clark and Chalmers use language as a prime example of reliable 
coupling: “Language appears to be a central means by which cognitive processes are extended 
into the world. […]. It may be that language evolved, in part, to enable such extensions of our 
cognitive resources within such coupled systems”.
28
 In an even stronger claim, Clark (1997) 
refers to language as “the ultimate cognitive artefact”, alluding to the crucial part it plays in 
aiding human cognition:
By “freezing” our own thoughts in the memorable, context-resistant, modality-
transcending format of a sentence, we thus create a special kind of mental object – an 
object that is amenable to scrutiny from multiple cognitive angles, is not doomed to 
alter or change every time we are exposed to new inputs or information, and fixes 
the ideas at a high level of abstraction from the idiosyncratic details of their proximal 
origins in sensory input.
29
 
It is noteworthy that the above quote, despite being about language and cognition in general, 
also aptly describes the quintessential part of the writing process, namely fixing an otherwise 
fleeting and fluid idea in the form of a sentence, in order to subsequently subject that sentence 
to “scrutiny from multiple cognitive angles” and eventually rephrase it or altogether eliminate 
it from the text. Doing all this “in the head” without resorting to pen and paper would be a 
very tedious and difficult task, as using external vehicles allows the writer to take a step back 
from the product of her imagination, which in turn facilitates its subsequent reappraisal and 
alteration. 
II. The extended mind theory and the (genesis of) narrative
The writer’s mind extended 
The logical first step in the analysis of the writer’s extended mind is determining which 
cognitive processes are involved in the act of creative writing, and if (and how) these processes 
can be extended according to the principles of the EMT. To this end I have used Linda Flower’s 
and John R. Hayes’s (1981) renown “Cognitive process theory of writing”, since they were the 
26 Hutto, D. and Myin, E. 
Radicalizing enactivism. 
Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2013, p. 
146, emphasis added.
27 Menary, R. Op. 
cit., 2010, p. 207.
28 Ibidem, p. 32.
29 Sutton, J. “Exograms 
and interdisciplinarity: 
history, the extended 
mind, and the civilizing 
process.” In: The 
extended mind, edited 
by Richard Menary. 
Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2010, p. 208.
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first to introduce an experience-based approach to the study of creative writing. Their main 
hypothesis is that “writing is best understood as a set of distinctive thinking processes which 
writers orchestrate and organise during the act of composing”.
30
 Against the dominant “stage 
model of writing” (with its clear-cut divisions between various stages of text production), the 
authors propose a continuum of additions, revisions, emendations, deletions, etc., by stressing 
“a constant process of ‘re-vision’ or re-seeing that goes on while [the writers] are composing”.
31
 
They claim that “because stage models take the final product as their reference point, they 




Another reason for taking Flower and Hayes’s theory as a guideline for the study of cognitive 
processes in writing is the fact that the authors do not belong to the “externalist” camp. Flower 
and Hayes clearly confine the cognitive processes related to writing to the writer’s head 
(calling them “the inner processes of decision and choice”). Taking a well-known “internalist” 
theory of cognition and successfully extending virtually all of its constituents seems a more 
convincing strategy than simply stating the externalist perspective on “writing as thinking” 
(such as Menary’s [2007] valuable contribution to the debate). The following discussion will 
demonstrate that the theory Flower and Hayes have produced is much more “extended” than 
originally intended. 
Flower and Hayes use the method of protocol analysis, in which they asked a group of 
writers to comment on their actual writing process (“compose out loud”), and studied the 
recorded comments in conjunction with the writers’ manuscripts and notes.
33
 It seems that 
the methodology itself constitutes an argument for extended cognition, as the participants are 
asked to literally interact with their texts as they go on rather than introspect on the process 
afterwards (something the researchers consider to be “notoriously inaccurate”).
34
 Furthermore, 
the material output of the writers’ work (i.e., manuscripts and notes) is also included in the 
analysis of their thinking processes. 
Flower and Hayes emphasise the non-linear nature of the writing process and divide the 
act of writing into three major elements: (1) the task environment, (2) the writer’s long-term 
memory, and (3) the writing process. The first element refers to “all of those things outside 
the writer’s skin, […] including the growing text itself”.
35
 Even this brief description makes 
clear that external factors play an essential role in creative writing, and the written text is 
explicitly mentioned. Far from advocating any form of extended cognition or implying hybrid 
cognitive processes involved in writing, Flower and Hayes nonetheless state that “each word 
in the growing text [i.e., an external component] determines and limits the choices of what can 
come next”.
36
 This interpretation of the role of the written text certainly allows for an extended 
reading of the writing process, because of the clearly pivotal role assigned to this “outside-the-
skin” element. I shall return to the text as part of the act of writing later in the section.
The second element – the writer’s long-term memory – is said to contain “stored knowledge” 
the writer may need in order to be able to create a particular piece of text.
37
 Once again, the 
authors mention an external element by stating that the long-term memory “can exist in the 
mind as well as in outside resources such as books”.
38
 Much like Otto, who keeps all the relevant 
information safely in his notebook, the writer creates a “storehouse of knowledge”
39
 in order to 
use it whenever necessary; it matters little whether the location of the knowledge is within the 
skull or beyond it, since both types of storage are functionally similar, and therefore the Parity 
30 Flower, L. and Hayes, 
J. R. A cognitive process 
theory of writing. 
College Composition 
and Communication, 
32.4, 1981,  p. 366, 
emphasis added.
31 Ibidem, p. 367.
32 Ibidem.
33 Ibidem, p. 368.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem, p. 369.
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Principle applies. Consequently, the second element also represents a hybrid cognitive system 
and is not entirely internal. 
The third element – the writing process itself – will prove a tougher nut to crack when it 
comes to its possible extension into the world. According to Flower and Hayes, its constituents 
include planning, translating, and reviewing, as well as a monitor function to supervise the 
whole and a number of sub-processes. Since the monitor function is clearly internal, and the 
discussion of the sub-processes would take up too much time and space, I shall zoom in briefly 
on the three processes that constitute the act of writing and attempt to take them beyond the 
bounds of skin and skull in one way or another.
Although they are certainly not described as hybrid by the researchers, a closer look at 
planning, translating and reviewing reveals a different picture. For instance, planning – defined 
by the authors as “form[ing] and internal representation of the knowledge that will be used 
in writing”
40
 – involves generating ideas as a sub-process, which in turn “includes retrieving 
relevant information from long-term memory”.
41
 We have seen, however, that the “storehouse 
of knowledge” that the long-term memory contains may be (and typically is) external: due to 
the fallibility of our natural memory, we would rather rely on notebooks to record information 
than memorise it (not to mention the inefficiency of the latter compared to the former). This 
means that ideas do not just materialise in the writer’s mind out of the blue; instead, more 
often than not they come from other sources beyond the skin. A good case in point might be 
the role of external sources of inspiration in the process of creative writing. Indeed, if we look 
at Beckett’s oeuvre, the influence of Dante, Shakespeare, or Proust (not to mention a whole 
array of philosophers) is unmistakably present, even if the aesthetic treatment of their heritage 
is very much Beckett’s own.  
As for the process of translating, Flower and Hayes define it as “putting ideas into visible 
language”.
42
 The role of language as an external entity imposed on the writer need hardly be 
elaborated on: we have briefly discussed language as an example of a coupled cognitive system 
above, and a more philosophical discourse on the subject is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Suffice it to say that the writer is caught between the private, internal “representations” he may 
have generated on the one hand, and the publicly shared, external linguistic systems of lexicon 
and syntax on the other, which makes the process of translation a hybrid one by definition. 
The last process, that of reviewing, is obviously related to the “text produced so far” (a 
rather self-explanatory term coined by Flower and Hayes): by reading what she has written, 
the writer will evaluate and revise the text.
43
 This process is highly relevant for our purposes, 
as genetic manuscript analysis focuses specifically on the changes the writer introduces into 
the subsequent drafts. Obviously, reviewing entails all the other elements involved in writing, 
which emphasises the circular nature of the creative process. In general, Flower and Hayes 
repeatedly state that all the processes they discuss are “embedded within other components”: 
in other words, there is no fixed order of their use, and they all constantly intervene with one 
another.
Despite the obvious spontaneous element implied by its inherent circularity, Flower and 
Hayes define writing as a goal-oriented process. However, this definition may be a little 
misleading because it typically implies thorough preparation and knowing in advance what 
the writer wants to achieve. In reality, as their research shows, “[goals] are created as people 
compose, throughout the entire process. This means that they do not emerge full-blown as 
the result of ‘pre-writing.’ Rather, […], they are created in close interaction with ongoing 
40 Ibidem, p. 372
41 Ibidem.
42 Flower, L. and Hayes, 
J. R. Op. cit., 1981, p. 373.
43 Ibidem, p. 374.
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exploration and the growing text”.
44
 Once again, the external dimension of creative writing 
is being emphasised here, and the role of the “text produced so far” proves to be crucial in “a 
sort of eternal triangle in which the writer’s goals, knowledge, and current text struggle for 
influence”.
45
 Flower and Hayes emphasise time and again that the interaction of these three 
elements drives the creative process much more than any pre-set objectives or plans the writer 
might have prepared beforehand. More often than not, “the text itself attempts to take control”, 
not to mention the general semantic and syntactic restrictions imposed on the writer by the 
language she uses to express her creativity (as mentioned above). Also, the physical act of 
writing is significant: at least one of the participants reported that “in writing the sentence, he 
not only saw that it was inadequate, but that his goals themselves could be expanded”.
46
  
The cognitive processes described above have been studied and analysed by the researchers 
from a clearly internalist perspective. In their conclusion, they “plac[e] emphasis on the 
inventive powers of the writer […], putting an important part of creativity where it belongs 
– in the hands of the working, thinking writer”.
47
 However, we have seen that virtually all 
of the aspects that Flower and Hayes have included in their “act of writing” constitutively 
incorporate external components. For one, the writer’s long-term memory - “the storehouse 
of knowledge” – is partly located outside the brain. Furthermore, the writer’s creativity is 
constrained by the demands of language – an indisputably external phenomenon. But the most 
important external object the authors constantly invoke is the text itself. Nearly everything the 
writer does – be it goal-setting, reviewing, or introducing changes of any kind – is the result 
of her interaction with the living, growing, ever changing set of symbols on paper, making the 
text the principal driving force of the writing process. 
The above analysis has shown that the “externalist” view on the writer’s brain and the 
written text as an illustrative example of a hybrid cognitive system seems to be endorsed by 
the evidence from a highly influential “internalist” theory of cognitive processes in writing. 
The pivotal importance of the written text and the changes it undergoes as part of the writer’s 
cognitive framework underscores the potential relevance of genetic manuscript research in 
the study of the writer’s (extended) mind as a model for human cognition. 
Samuel Beckett and extended cognition
 
Having covered the more theoretical aspects, such as the foundational principles of the 
EMT and their application to the theory of cognitive processes in creative writing, we move 
on to the practical case study of Samuel Beckett (as a representative of late modernism) and his 
oeuvre. The following section will elucidate the reasons behind the choice of Beckett and his 
oeuvre for both genetic manuscript research and an enquiry into (extended) human cognition. 
Afterwards, a number of examples from his prose and plays will be discussed as the cases of 
extended fictional minds. In this connection it is important to remember that (as mentioned 
above) attempting to sketch Beckett’s extended mind as a “modernist writer” and uncovering 
extended fictional minds in his “modernist texts” “does not imply a conflation of author and 
character”.
48
 The plan is to maintain the texts’ autonomy by keeping the two levels completely 
separate.
The idea of choosing a real-life writer in general and Samuel Beckett in particular as an 
example of (extended) human cognition has a number of reasons behind it. First of all, using 
44 Ibidem, p. 378.
45 Ibidem, p. 380.
46 Ibidem, p. 385, 
emphasis added.
47 Ibidem, p. 386.
48 Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit.,  2014, p. 130.
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a real-life case to support the EMT (in contrast to the thought experiments that underpin the 
original theory) will possibly add value and credibility to the principle of extended cognition 
in general. Indeed, demonstrating how a real mind can be extended to include external objects 
and successfully proving the existence of such a hybrid system by means of genetic critical 
analysis would answer Sutton’s call for “more particularized illustrative studies” instead of 
“work[ing] with an overly restricted and puritanical notion of scientific explanation”.
49
 Samuel 
Beckett’s habit of preserving his notebooks and drafts provides us with a wealth of material 
for such a study. 
Besides this more “practical” reason, there are others that make Beckett and his oeuvre 
highly suitable subjects of enquiry into human cognition. To begin with, his lifelong interest in 
the mystery of the human mind is well known: the fact that the mind is the principal subject in 
virtually all his works should make it easier to analyse the evocations of the fictional minds of 
his characters. From the very start, the mind has been thematised by Beckett, even meriting a 
separate chapter (albeit a short one) in his first published novel Murphy (1938). Incidentally, the 
same novel turns on Murphy’s self-proclaimed mind/body split – Descartes’s famous notion 
that has earned Beckett the reputation of a devout Cartesian (although the more recent Beckett 
scholarship is more than divided on that subject).  
At the same time, Beckett’s “obsession” with the mind harbours a significant difficulty: 
in his later prose, there are virtually no characters worth the name, as the texts become 
increasingly obscure in terms of structure, plot and action. The only “presence” is that of some 
abstract entity (usually little more than a voice) engaged in a tormented, chaotic, and seemingly 
incessant stream of consciousness. In such cases, the question arises whether any external 
aspects in the fictional world can be identified in order for the fictional mind to be extended. 
It seems that the only possible line of enquiry here is the use of language: even the seemingly 
inward-looking “voices” in Beckett’s late(r) prose are condemned to express themselves in 
language, however deficient they consider it to be as a means of expression. 
Beckett’s involvement in language issues is also well documented. The most famous 
example is his so-called “German letter of 1937” to his friend Axel Kaun, in which he confesses 
his own frustrations with the ultimate writer’s tool and proposes to “bore one hole after 
another in it” in order to see what “lurks behind it, be it something or nothing”.
50
 In his novel 
Watt, the eponymous hero becomes gradually unintelligible to his environment by inverting 
first the order of sentences, then of words in the sentences, and finally of letters in the words, 
illustrating the impossibility and the insanity of a “private” language. As we have seen above 
in our discussion on philosophy of mind, language is often used as the perfect example of 
a hybrid cognitive system by the “externalist” camp in cognitive science; in this connection, 
Beckett’s constant thematisation of language as a fatally flawed yet inevitable part of human 
cognition is a valuable nuance.
Another compelling reason for choosing Beckett as the case study for the project is his 
keen interest in philosophy. There is a great amount of illuminating research on this subject, 
much of which either defends or rejects Beckett’s alleged Cartesianism. Beckett’s “Philosophy 
notes”, based largely on a handful of encyclopaedias of (Western) philosophy, are a particularly 
interesting object of exogenetic research,
51
 and as such are more than just a brilliant example 
of Beckett’s profound erudition and extraordinary diligence. Keeping in mind Flower and 
Hayes’s theory of cognitive processes in writing, Beckett’s “storehouse of knowledge” was 
clearly external to a very large extent, as well as being an unmistakable source of ideas that 
49 Menary, R.  Op. 
cit.,  2010, p. 214.
50 Beckett, S. Disjecta, 
edited by Ruby Cohn. 
New York: Grove 
Press, 1984, pp. 51-54.
51 I refer in particular to 
Matthew Feldman’s 
excellent Beckett’s books 
(2006) as a fine example 
of such research.
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have found their way into Beckett’s works throughout his writing career (albeit much more 
explicitly in his earlier period and much less so in his mature work).
Beckett’s recurring thematisation of the painstaking process of creative writing is yet 
another reason why his oeuvre is a suitable research object. Two points of interest in this 
connection deserve mention here. First of all, Beckett’s writing underwent a number of 
perturbations: from wordy and extremely intertextual in his early period to writing in French 
and a tendency towards “lessness” in the middle period, and finally to short and increasingly 
hermetic pieces with scarcely any structure or characters towards the end of his writing career. 
It seems that the growing insecurity and doubt in the writing style is reflected in the nigh on 
palpable desperation and exasperated soul-searching the characters display, and vice versa. 
The relationship between the writer and his work is famously epitomised in Malone Dies, a 
novel in which the writer/narrator constantly questions his writing and forms an inseparable 
duo with his “exercise-book”, resulting in a climactic merger of the two at the novel’s end.
The second interesting factor in Beckett’s writing is his self-translation (between English 
and French), which often generated changes in the text beyond those necessitated by 
translation alone. This is a good example of the writer’s interaction with his text even after the 
final version (in the original language) has been published, and the textual differences between 
Beckett’s English and French versions provide valuable material for epigenetic research. 
Examples of extended fictional minds in Beckett’s texts
It goes without saying that connecting fictional minds to their environments is a much 
more challenging affair than analysing the real-life mind of a writer. First of all, “reading” the 
fictional mind is more often than not a question of interpretation: while one can plausibly 
connect an entry in a notebook to a particular episode in the narrative it relates to, inferring 
the link between the characters’ minds and their fictional worlds is arguably much less 
straightforward. On top of that, the exclusive use of the EMT for fictional minds could prove 
too restrictive and generate a limited set of examples, since it might prove difficult to find 
convincing cases of truly hybrid cognitive processes in fictional texts. For this reason, this 
enquiry (unlike that of the writer’s extended mind) will also incorporate other strands of 
“active externalism”, such as Hutto and Myin’s radical enactivism (REC)
52
 and other (if slightly 
less radical) theories of enacted/embodied cognition.   
We have seen above that Beckett’s lifelong thematisation of the mind makes his oeuvre a 
highly suitable object for any study of fictional minds. What follows is an overview of several 
cases of extended cognition to be found in Beckett’s oeuvre (mostly from his early to middle 
period) that contain the more or less clearly identifiable minds interacting actively with their 
fictional environments.
To begin with, the eponymous hero of Beckett’s first published novel Murphy (1938) uses 
his rocking chair in order to arrive at a certain mental state: by undressing and tying himself 
to the chair, and by rocking it in a particular tempo, he attains a state of bliss that eludes him 
52 REC stands for 
Radically Enacted/
Embodied Cognition 
and claims that “basic 
human minds” – i.e., 
the minds we use for 
everyday activities 
– do not have any 
intrinsic content of 
their own, and derive 
any information they 
might need from their 
context (unlike the 
EMT that insists of the 
irreducible presence of 
the internal component 
in human cognition). 
For details, see Hutto 
and Myin (2013).
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without the external prop the chair represents. Staying with Murphy, it is also remarkable how 
the protagonist’s entire life is determined by his horoscope, compiled for him by an Indian 
sage, although the link from this clearly external object to Murphy’s cognitive processes is 
harder to substantiate. Furthermore, the novel’s setting in London and the dominant presence 
of the urban environment (with detailed descriptions of streets, houses, parks, etc.) provides 
more than just a backdrop for Murphy’s self-searching: it seems that his mind is rooted in 
his physical surroundings and cannot be separated from them (despite Murphy’s desperate 
attempts to sever the connection).
A possibly more illustrative example comes from one of Beckett’s plays, Krapp’s Last Tape, 
in which a tape recorder occupies (quite literally) a central place in the setting. In fact, the 
whole play turns on Krapp’s interaction with his younger self by means of a number of reels 
he plays on the tape recorder. It is through the manipulation of the external objects (i.e., the 
tape recorder and the reels) that Krapp’s memories and thoughts take shape, making the tape 
recorder part of a hybrid cognitive system.
53
In Modern manuscripts, Dirk Van Hulle discusses a beautiful example from Beckett’s late prose, 
which (as mentioned above) is almost entirely devoid of fully-fledged characters or any context 
worth the name. In “Ceiling” – a short fragment describing a mind regaining consciousness 
– “Beckett ‘extends’ the mind by making neural processes interact with an external element”.
54
 
By gradually discerning the “dull white” of the ceiling, the mind (presumably of a person lying 
on his back in a room and looking up) slowly re-enters the realm of the conscious, thus going 
through a hybrid cognitive process that includes an external object. Although the “constitutive” 
role of the ceiling might be contested in this case (as some might suggest that the ceiling is a 
mere trigger of purely internal cognitive activity), I agree with Van Hulle that this example 
could qualify as the case of an extended fictional mind.
Finally, one example from Beckett’s novel Watt might be said to illustrate another model 
of extended cognition, namely Hutto and Myin’s radical enactivism (see note 52 above). Watt’s 
elusive master, Mr Knott, seems to exist entirely by virtue of his servants feeding him with a 
highly nutritious mixture of ingredients. Besides that, Mr Knott’s appearance changes all the 
time, and nobody seems to know for certain what he looks like. To put it another way, Mr 
Knott seems to completely lack any distinctive content of his own, absorbing instead whatever 
the others (i.e., his servants) offer him. Because of these (and other) properties, it is plausible 
to treat Mr Knott as a metaphor for the mind that thrives on the sensory inputs the servants 
represent. Developing this idea a bit further, I propose that Mr Knott can be considered a 
fine example of a “basic mind without content”, which, according to Hutto et al., is “the most 




The purpose of this paper was to elucidate my on-going PhD project that links the extended 
mind theory to literary Modernism and of which the study of Samuel Beckett’s writing style 
and fictional minds forms the practical core. In particular, the paper has aimed to provide an 
explanation and motivation for the choices of (a) Modernism for exploring (extended) cognition 
in literature, (b) the EMT from a number of other “active externalist” options, (c) the writer 
in general as a model for (extended) human cognition, and (d) Samuel Beckett as a suitable 
53 Incidentally, the 
very idea for a play 
with a tape recorder 
playing such a pivotal 
role seems to have 
occurred to Beckett 
after his listening to the 
“reel-to-reel playback 
of Molloy and From 
An Abandoned Work” 
(Feldman, 2014, p. 47) 
– which is another case 
of the environment (in 
this case, technology) 
constitutively 
influencing the author’s 
mind. I would like to 
thank Pim Verhulst 
for bringing this 
to my attention.
54 Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit.,  2014, p. 206.
55 Hutto, D.; Kirchhoff, 
M. D.  and Myin, E. 
Extensive enactivism: 
why keep it all in? 
Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8, 2014, 
1n, doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2014.00706. 
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case study. By “extending” cognitive processes involved in creative writing according to the 
principles of the EMT, and by showing that Beckett’s fictional minds regularly interact with 
their narrative environments, the paper has hopefully demonstrated that literary Modernism 
is not as inward-looking as its illustrious representatives intended it to be. To return to Woolf’s 
passionate conviction that got us started, it seems that the “the proper stuff of fiction” in fact 
stretches far beyond the “look within” and inevitably includes “the alien and external” she so 
despised.
56
 Advocating a similar idea in the realm of philosophy (long before the emergence of 
“active externalism”), Martin Heidegger – another great modernist – aptly defined a human 
being as Dasein (1927, literally “being there”). The idea of the mind’s “splendid isolation” from 
the world, however deeply entrenched in cognitive science or in modernist literary criticism, 
thus turns out to be little more than an old but stubbornly persistent Cartesian illusion. 
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